Research

Work in Progress

Job Market Paper- Collusion through worker mobility: An experiment (with Peter J. McGee) 

The primary difference between the definitions explicit and tacit collusion in the literature is that the firms communicate directly in the former and do not communicate in the latter.  Collusion is easier to establish and maintain with explicit collusion than tacit collusion, but it also comes with increased risks of detection and legal penalties.  We investigate a gray area between these two, where collusion occurs through workers moving between firms.  In experimental Bertrand markets with either two or four firms, workers moving between firms lead to higher market prices, higher firm prices, more attempts at collusive pricing, and more frequent market sharing.  The effects of worker mobility is more pronounced in the four firm market where collusion should be more difficult to achieve.  Using team chats, we can see that, while subjects rarely discuss specific collusive prices, they often discuss trying to encourage everyone to raise prices.

Strangers Like Me: Does Group Affiliation Serve as a Noisy Signal of Agents’ Types? (with J. Braxton Gately, and Ashley McCrea)

Focal point collusion, teams, and industry-specific human capital (with Peter J. McGee)